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ABSTRACT

Davis, Sydney, L., M. S., University of South Alabama, May 2022. Enhancing System
Security Using Dynamic Hardware. Chair of Committee: Todd, Andel, Ph.D.
Within the ever-advancing field of computing, there is significant research into
the many facets of cyber security. However, there is very little research to support the
concept of using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to increase the security of a
system. While its most common use is to provide efficiency and speedup of processes,
this research considers the use of an FPGA to mitigate vulnerabilities in both software
and hardware. This paper proposes circuit variance within an FPGA as a method of
Moving Target Defense (MTD) and investigates its effect on side-channels. We
hypothesize that although the functionality of native and variant circuits is the same, their
subsequent side-channel characterizations will differ thus creating unique
electromagnetic signatures. The investigation and observations of the study include
circuit variant construction, side channel attacks and analyses, and subsequent
comparisons of electromagnetic signatures. We found that in the analysis of variant DES
implementations, there are small but present differences in side channel depictions from
native to variant.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly technologically advancing world, ensuring the security of
systems and their integrity against malicious attacks has become a major research focus
in the computer security community. Although computer security and its many facets are
advancing at an exponential rate, hackers are unfortunately progressing at a similar rate.
Just recently, an Equifax data breach orchestrated by a community of hackers cost 143
million Americans the sensitivity of their confidential personal information [1].
Misfortunes such as these generate an even bigger outcry for more secure systems. A
very widely used method of securing these systems is moving target defense otherwise
known as MTD. This technique creates a more difficult environment for an attacker to
implement a successful intrusion thus defending against vulnerabilities within the system
[2], [3], [4], [5]. Although there are various types of MTDs, a specific application is the
use of circuit variance, which at its most basic level is the act of generating equivalent
circuits to produce variants that are constantly changing over a previously specified
period. Using these variants creates the illusion that the entire system is constantly
changing which assists in making it more challenging for an attacker to reverse engineer
the system.
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In this research, we investigate the utilization of programmable hardware to
identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in software and/or hardware. We theorize that
implementing circuit variance as a method of MTD will provide added security to a given
system because side channel characterizations of native and variant will be different. In
exploration of this theory, we chose an FPGA as the programmable hardware and decided
on a simple implementation of DES encryption as the native circuit. The goal of the
research is to determine if side channel characterizations, whether power consumption or
electromagnetic signatures, differ between native and variant although they are
functionally equivalent.

1.1 Research Question and Goals
Often defense mechanisms for system intrusions by attackers are fixed. The
defenses stay the same and do not vary therefore allowing attackers ample time to
determine the inner workings of a circuit with the purpose of reverse engineering it. This
paper proposes circuit variance as a method of moving target defense (MTD) to counter
attacks and increase the overall level of security for the system. We theorize that while
the functionality of native and variant circuits is the same, their subsequent side-channel
characterizations will differ thus creating unique electromagnetic signatures.
The goal of this research is to determine if employing circuit variance as a method
of moving target defense (MTD) will provide varying levels of security. The fundamental
question underlying the research is “How does circuit variant implementation relate to
side channel characterization?” Therefore, in this approach, the side-channel
characteristics of a native DES circuit implementation and its variants will be evaluated
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and compared with the purpose of determining if these characteristics can distinguish
native from variant.

1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this document is outlined as follows: Chapter II presents an
overview of background concepts and related works. Chapter III describes in detail the
methodology and process for the experimental setup and analyzation of data. Chapter IV
details our experimental results and discussion. Chapter V summarizes our conclusions
and gives a brief proposal for potential future work.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

This chapter provides background on frequently mentioned concepts and methods
in Chapter III as well as an overview of relevant literature in this field. Section 2.1 offers
the contextual information necessary to grasp the concepts presented in the remainder of
this document including an overview of such topics as moving target defense, circuit
variance, properties of FPGAs, and side channel analysis Section 2.2, presents and
summarizes relevant related works in this research area including but not limited to
dynamic code mutation, and software partitioning.

2.1 Background
In this section, several key words and phrases will be defined in detail. These
subsections and their contents will help to give a well-rounded view of the research area
and in turn create a level knowledge base for those unfamiliar with the specifics of this
field.
2.1.1 Moving Target Defense (MTD)
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a fairly new concept of security that involves
increasing entropy in any given system in order to reduce the attack surface available to
hackers or any entity that would do harm to the system [3], [2], [4]. In systems, both
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hardware and software, that do not utilize an MTD method an attacker’s biggest
advantage is often the static nature of the system [2], [5]. Because manufacturers do not
always design a system with an attacker’s plans in mind, most systems are vulnerable to
intrusion based solely on the fact that there is no variance within the system itself. An
attacker can take all the time he needs to attempt to reverse engineer the circuit or the
program because he knows that he can always return to this same circuit or program.
Conversely, employing MTD confuses attackers by creating more entropy or randomness
thus allowing a considerably smaller window for successful invasions. Investigating this
method using obfuscation and/or circuit variance is the overarching goal of this research.
2.1.2 Obfuscation
Obfuscation is one of several defense mechanisms used to mitigate attacks by
hackers that would do harm to a system. It is simply the use of obscurity to thwart
intrusion. Designers who implement obfuscation into their code or circuits desire to make
the code or circuit as challenging to comprehend as possible while still retaining the
identical functionality [6], [7]. The use of obfuscation reduces the chances of an attacker
reverse engineering a system in order to gain access to it [2], [5], [8]. By making the
system harder to interpret, the attacker must spend more time attempting to figure it out.
Using this tactic as a form of moving target defense (MTD) along with the entropy it
creates helps to ensure the security of a system. This research investigates circuit
obfuscation by introducing redundancies into the variant DES implementation to be
analyzed therefore expanding the circuit.
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2.1.3 Circuit Variance
Circuit variance is the method of creating obfuscated logic or generating
functionally equivalent variants of a circuit with the intention of creating a more difficult
environment for an attacker to thrive [7], [6], [8]. These variants are a “family of
equivalent circuits that maintain the functional program properties…, but look entirely
different from a structural point of view” [9]. Circuit variance is a type of dynamic
variation meaning that the variants generated are constantly changing over a period of
time. This variation in the structure of the logic would appear to an attacker as several
completely different circuits as opposed to variants of the same logic. Because one of the
first things an adversary must determine when attempting to reverse engineer a system
are the different components of a circuit and their function within that circuit, using this
obfuscated logic within the system aids in deterring the adversary from going any further
in their plans to tamper with the system.
2.1.4 Field Programmable Gate Arrays and Application-Specific Circuits
Field Programmable Gate Arrays otherwise known as FPGAs are powerful,
reconfigurable integrated circuits that have logic structures that can execute the logic of a
given circuit or program [2], [10]. They consist of an array of interconnected logic blocks
that can be programmed at both the function of the logic blocks, the connections between
the blocks, and the inputs and outputs [11]. In this regard, the FPGA is considered
reconfigurable hardware. FPGAs combine the advantages of general-purpose processors
and specialized circuits because they can be reconfigured during run-time to better meet
the needs of a system. These chips are quickly replacing the widely accepted ApplicationSpecific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). An ASIC is a smaller and faster integrated circuit that
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unlike an FPGA, has its logical structure hardwired into its design. Although smaller and
faster than an FPGA, an ASIC is not reconfigurable like an FPGA. This along with cost
and scope of use are causing the ASIC to be replaced with the FPGA more and more
[10], [9].
Since its invention, the applications of the FGPA have included speeding up
security processes, ensuring the integrity of a program during run-time, and increasing
overall program speed [9], [12]. Although several of its applications have to do with
enhancing the security of a system by providing speedup of security processing, FPGAs
themselves have not been the specifically used to mitigate software or hardware
vulnerabilities. This research, however, considers the use of FPGAs to identify and
potentially mitigate vulnerabilities within various circuits and their side channel
characterizations.
2.1.5 Partial Reconfiguration and Partial Dynamic Reconfiguration (PR & PDR)
“Partial reconfiguration and partial dynamic reconfiguration is the ability of an
FPGA to change its functionality without having to be powered down” [2]. This means
the FPGA can be reconfigured during execution time. There are two different types of
PR: difference-based and module-based. Difference based partial reconfiguration is a
process in which there are small changes made to an FPGA configuration by relating to
the FPGA what the difference is between the old and new configurations. Module based
partial reconfiguration makes uses of several modular design concepts to reconfigure
large blocks of logic within the FPGA. These large blocks of logic are then able to
replace old configurations without disrupting the rest of the hardware [2], [13]. An
advantage of utilizing PR and PDR is increased performance within a system. By using
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these techniques, a system can perform without a loss of functionality because of the
hardware’s ability to efficiently function without powering down every time something
needs to be reconfigured. Another advantage of the use of PR and PDR is reduced power
consumption and overall size/amount of the hardware used [14]. This functionally is
essential in allowing for the concepts proposed in this research into the possibilities of
run-time circuit variance and obfuscation for the purpose of system security.
2.1.6 Dynamic Hardware/Software Partitioning
Hardware/Software partitioning can be defined as dividing a program into
software on a microprocessor and hardware co-processors. This approach has recently
incorporated the use of an FPGA and microprocessor on a single chip, as the hardware,
which has made the process more efficient. “By treating the FPGA as an extension of the
microprocessor, a designer can move critical software regions from the microprocessor
onto FPGA hardware, resulting in improved performance and usually reduced energy
consumption…”[15]. Although this is often used as an energy consumption reduction
technique, this paper proposes that it be used to better ensure the integrity of a program
and its overall security.
2.1.7 Side Channel Analysis (SCA)
Side channel leakage can be easily defined as specific information leakage [16].
Often side channel leakage is in the form of energy or power consumption. SCA attacks
are attempts by attackers to use system leakage such as power consumption to aid in
reverse engineering that system or to leak cryptographic keying information. “These
attacks are conducted by collecting power consumption data of the hardware, referred to
as power traces…and statistically correlating this data to the cryptographic key.” [9].
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Once the attackers obtain the cryptographic key, the system is essentially hacked; and all
of this has been done by just analyzing the subsequent side channels of the system. This
research proposes that circuit variance, obfuscation, and dynamic reconfiguration will
increase the difficulty of side channel analysis, adding to the overall security of a given
system.
2.1.8 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
Differential Power Analysis is an SCA technique that utilizes power side channels
to obtain cryptographic keys. Power attacks seek to ascertain information related to
operations and manipulated data by examining a device’s power consumption [17]. These
attacks are carried out “by collecting power consumption data of the hardware, referred to
as power traces…and statistically correlating this data to the cryptographic key” [18]. A
trace usually shows at least one iteration of encryption, but it is possible to generate a
more detailed view of the operation depending on the equipment used to take the
measurements and complete the analysis. To take these traces, a current probe must be
placed in series with the power source to accurately capture the current. A trigger must
also be configured to prompt the probe to capture traces.
Once the probe and trigger are placed and configured, the attacker must decide
which part of the algorithm she would like to analyze. For example, if analyzing the Data
Encryption Standard, the analysis can either be performed on the first round of DES with
the plaintext or on the sixteenth round with the ciphertext. If the analysis is chosen to be
performed on the first round, the subkey along with the inputs to each S-box are
calculated in turn and their outputs analyzed. Conversely, if the analysis is on the last
round, the outputs to each box are calculated and their inputs analyzed.
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Once traces are gathered, power consumption curves (PCCs) are collected. These
are differential curves derived from box output bits. Because there are sixty-four partial
subkey combinations, sixty-four of these traces must be performed. In the analysis, a very
noticeable spike should be present in the PCC that was plotted with the correct subkey
bits which gives confirmation of key block guesses. Repeating this process yields all 48
subkey bits for the round (where the last 8 bits can be determined by analyzing another
round) [17], [19]. Because our goal is not to break the DES cipher and acquire the key,
the PCCs will not be gathered and analyzed for subkey bits. Although DPA will not be
used directly in this research, power side channels will be collected and analyzed to make
comparisons between variant circuits.
2.1.9 Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
Electromagnetic analysis is an attack that captures and analyzes electromagnetic
emanations from a target device. “Since each active component of the device produces
and induces various types of emanations, these emanations provide multiple views of
events unfolding within the device at each clock cycle” [20]. Electromagnetic
emanations or emissions are the results of current flows through different parts of the
device. These emanations can either be intentional or unintentional. The intentional
emissions are created from intentional current flows in the device and often correspond to
short bursts of current. The unintentional emissions on the other hand are created as a
result of proximity. The proximity of the hardware components on a device result in
electrical and electromagnetic coupling, and this in turn creates the emanations. The
unintentional emanations often provide especially useful and often compromising
information about a device and the programs running on it [20]. Because the foundation
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of EMA is emanations, it is important to note that in CMOS devices current only flows
when logic states are changed; and the changing of states is controlled by a square-wave
clock. This in turn means that the resulting emanations carry valuable information about
what a program may be doing during each clock cycle.
Analysis of the electromagnetic side channel of a DES cipher begins like DPA
with the placement of current probes in addition to near field probes. The near field probe
must be placed on the smartcard as close to the microprocessor as possible. The current
probe on the other hand is placed in series with the power supply to capture the changing
currents through the device. A powerful scope must also be used to capture enough
samples of the executing cipher for a meaningful trace. Just like DPA, a trigger is needed
to prompt the software to begin taking traces of the cipher. Before traces are collected, an
XY scan must be completed on the device to determine the precise location the cipher or
process is executing. With the probes and capturing equipment programmed to this
hotspot, the signal can be collected. Once captured, the data is analyzed and evaluated
similar to that of a DPA attack.
2.1.10 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
The Data Encryption Standard was chosen for evaluation in this research for a
variety of factors. First, the cipher is very well known, very easily implemented, and very
easily broken. Although these would be cons when determining whether to implement
this cipher in real-world applications, these reasons are what makes it a desirable cipher
for research purposes. Because our purpose in implementing the cipher is not to break it,
it is even more suitable for this research. Second, the DES cipher is very well supported
in the Program Encryption Toolkit (PET) that this research will be utilizing to create both
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native and variant circuits for evaluation. This toolkit is our circuit generator of choice, so
it follows that we choose a cipher that is compatible. Lastly, side channels of DES
ciphers are widely evaluated and are able to be straightforwardly analyzed because of the
simplicity of the algorithm.
The Data Encryption Standard, often referred to as DES, is a cipher method
formulated by researchers at IBM in the early 1970s and adopted into the United States
government’s National Bureau of Standards by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology in 1977 [21]. It was the first encryption method to be endorsed by the United
States government and used for classification at a federal level.
The algorithm for this method can be described in its simplest form as a
substitution cipher where “an input block of 64 bits, regarded as a ‘letter’ in this alphabet,
is replaced with a new letter, the output block” [22]. A graphical representation of this
simple algorithm can be found in Figure 2.1 [23]. Essentially, the DES algorithm takes an
input of 64 bits and a key of 64 bits and generates the ciphertext output of 64 bits. In the
64 bit key however, we can see that only 56 bits are used as the effective key and the
remaining 8 are used as parity bits [24].
Within this algorithm, the encryption of the plaintext or input block is handled in
16 rounds meaning there are 16 identical iterations of the same encryption operation.
Before the first round, the input block is fed through an initial permutation (IP) and
divided into 32-bit halves. Within each round, the left and right halves of the input block
are each operated on and fed into the next round with the only difference in the rounds
being that the expanded right 32 bits are XOR-ed with a subkey. Each round uses a
different subkey derived from the main 64-bit key. After the final round is completed,
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Figure 2.1 Basic DES Cipher [23].

“the right and left bits are concatenated and finally pass through a final
permutation…which is the inverse of the initial permutation (IP)” and the subsequent
output is the 64 bit ciphertext block [21], [25], [22], [24]. An image outlining this portion
of the algorithm can be found in Figure 2.2 [26]. Because this encryption is a private key
algorithm, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption meaning that the
decryption process is identical to the encryption process save that the subkeys are used in
reverse order [24].
For ease of access and the need for a variety of applications of DES, four different
modes of operation were developed for the algorithm: Electronic Codebook (ECB),
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), and Output Feedback (OFB).
Each of these modes successfully implements DES encryption, but all in a different way
and for use in different applications. OFB is often used for encrypting satellite
communications while CBC and CFB are most commonly used to authenticate
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Figure 2.2 Detailed DES Overview.

data. [21], [25], [27]. Various applications of DES include “automated key management
applications, file encryption, mail encryption, satellite data encryption, and other
applications” [21].
Because of the way DES was developed and the fact that it is a publicly known
algorithm, it has become a relatively easy encryption algorithm to break, making it
vulnerable to attacks. Although DES is still widely used in a variety of applications and
functions, in most cases it has been replaced with the newer and more secure Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) as well as others. A combination of the publicity of the DES
algorithm and the easily identifiable 16 rounds of encryption contribute to why it has
been chosen for side channel analysis in this paper. In addition to the vulnerability of the
algorithm, it’s ease of implementation on reconfigurable hardware, specifically FPGAs,
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is another motive for using such a cipher. The implementation of a well-known cipher
will aid in analyzing the difference between native and variant circuits. In this work, it is
important to remember our goal is not to break the cipher using SCA, rather it is to
understand the effect of functional cipher variants on side channel characterizations; and
for this reason, we have chosen DES for the analysis.

2.2 Related Works
In researching topics related to software protection and circuit variance, there
were two papers that stood out as integral related works. The first is a conference paper
by authors Madou et al. [28] entitled Software Protection through Dynamic Code
Mutation.
This paper focuses on techniques for circuit variance. The second of these papers was a
graduate thesis, Enhanced Software Security through Program Partitioning, written by L.
Whitehurst. In her thesis, Whitehurst aims to provide a technique for program
partitioning. The methods proposed in each of these papers provide the basis for the
research completed in this thesis.
2.2.1 Software Protection through Dynamic Code Mutation
In their 2005 conference paper, Madou et al. [28] propose dynamic code mutation
as a way to secure software. They begin their paper by outlining just how negative the
aftereffects of reverse engineering can be on a system. They make it clear that one of the
most effective ways of deterring hackers and the like from attempting to illegally obtain
access to a system is to make the attack surface as small as possible by making the code
as incomprehensible as it can be while still retaining functionality. In this paper, they
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focus on obfuscated code variants that change dynamically while the program runs as the
way to do this [28]. The authors suggest that although there has been some research on
dynamic code generation, the techniques described in their conference paper are
considerably different because the previous research was not done with the intent to
thwart hackers and reverse engineering.
Madou et al. [28] consider two types of code mutation in their paper, one-pass
mutation and cluster-based mutation which both work through the use of edit scripts.
They define one-pass mutation as a code mutation technique where a procedure or piece
of code is made into a template and “scrambled” until right before it is to be executed. At
this time, the code is put back into its original form for execution. Cluster-based mutation
on the other hand is defined as a technique whereby one procedure or piece of code
generates several different variants or a cluster of variants that will all map to the same
memory locations. They assert that the larger the cluster, the greater the degree of
obfuscation because the large number of variants all mapping to the same memory
location in turn creates more confusion and entropy [28].
In their experiment, the authors created a prototype of the code mutation
technique using the tool Diablos. They found that using both obfuscation methods, both
one-pass and cluster-based, they are capable of protecting 92% of all (non-library)
procedures in a program [28]. From this and various other results, they concluded that
their dynamic code mutation technique gave the intended results so long as the variants or
random generator are not broken. The discoveries made by Madou et al. in their research
lends better insight into the realm of software protection through obfuscation which in
turn enables MTD at the hardware level.
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2.2.2 Enhanced Software Security through Program Partitioning
In her graduate thesis, Whitehurst [12] proposes that partitioning a program
between a general-purpose processor (GPP) and an FPGA can mitigate attacks that rely
on a stack. She proposes that this method of placing software vulnerabilities onto an
FPGA can eliminate vulnerabilities altogether, specifically software vulnerable to buffer
overflow attacks [12]. In her problem statement, she states that although FPGA’s have
been used to speed up the security of a system and several other applications, they have
not actually been used for the purpose of providing security to a system. This method
would be useful because by placing the parts of a piece of software vulnerable to attacks
that require address spaces onto an FPGA which has no addresses to attack, the overall
program is made more secure [12].
To test this hypothesis, Whitehurst created a vulnerable program and showed the
vulnerabilities to attacks on two GPPs. She then tested two more partitioned programs
against these same attacks to directly compare the security against the buffer overflow
attacks. In her results, she discussed how the vulnerable program that did not utilize the
partitioning method did in fact succumb to the buffer overflow attack; but the programs
which did utilize the partitioning method prevented the attack and were successfully
secured [12].
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

To complete this research and determine if our hypothesis can be supported there
are several objectives that need to be met. Those objectives and their sub-objectives are
below:
1. Obtain native DES circuit implementation and generate variants
a. Use Program Encryption Toolkit to generate variants and translate
from BENCH files to VHDL
2. Implement three distinct hardware variants of DES onto an FPGA
a. Program FPGA with Xilinx’s Vivado Development Kit(s)
3. Capture related side channels from both native and variant(s) under
operation
a. Utilize the Riscure hardware and software (Inspector SCA)
b. Capture electromagnetic signatures as well as power consumption
behavior
4. Evaluate/analyze differences between the signals
a. Determine if the implementation of circuit variance changes the
circuit enough that its signatures present as a completely different
circuit.
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3.1 Explaining the Approach
The work for this research has been carried out in three distinct tasks. Task I
describes the process of ascertaining an original DES circuit implementation and the
generation of its variants. Task II summarizes programming the native and variant
hardware implementations onto an FPGA. And Task III outlines side channel analysis
and comparison of these analyses.
3.1.1 Task I
This task describes how the various DES circuits were ascertained as well as the
method of language translation for the circuits. The three circuits we use in this research
were originally BENCH netlists obtained from thesis committee member, Dr. Jeffrey
McDonald. These circuits are implementations of DES encryption generated from Dr.
McDonald’s Program Encryption Toolkit (PET). We believe the PET-generated circuits
are implementing DES encryption, but these circuits cannot be verified against other
implementations of DES. It seems the input/output relationships within these circuits
contain different byte ordering than those employed in verifiable DES implementations.
Although the generated ciphertext from these circuits does not directly resemble DES
encryption, the ciphertext for both native and variant circuits are equivalent. Therefore,
we will continue utilizing these circuits in this research as the fundamental question and
hypothesis center around side channel characterizations of functionally equivalent
circuits and not the functionality of the circuits themselves.
Of these circuits, the native is the simplest of the three, and the variants are
functional equivalents to the native circuit with added redundancies for obfuscation. The
redundancies in the variant circuits were created by inserting multiple AND-trees to the
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logic of the native circuit while allowing it to keep its original functionality. AND-trees
are essentially trees that perform the logical AND operation upon all inputs into the tree
[29]. With circuit inputs as inputs to the AND-trees, the addition of these trees adds only
redundancy into the circuits. The functionality and integrity of the circuits themselves
remains unchanged and it is for this reason they were chosen for obfuscation in this
research. The two variants differ in that one uses 20 AND-trees for obfuscation and the
other uses 50. Hereafter the native, 20 AND-tree variant and 50 AND-tree variants will
be referred to as Native DES, Variant DES_20, and Variant DES_50 respectively.
Because the circuits were originally in BENCH netlist format, they need to be
translated before they are used to program the FPGA. To do this, PET is again utilized.
This software, while it has many functions, is used in this research to take the original
netlists of the circuits, decompose any multi-fan-in, and translate them into VHDL so that
they can be used in the Vivado Design Suite. The translation could be done by hand, but
because the circuits all have upwards of 20,000 total gates, utilizing PET makes this
process more efficient and reliable. A flow chart of this process can be found in Figure
3.1.
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Figure 3.1 PET Translation Flow.

3.1.2 Task II
The following section summarizes the process of packaging the DES circuit(s)
and programming them onto the Zedboard’s FPGA. The details of the development
environment can be found in Table 3.1.
Once Native DES, Variant DES_20, and Variant DES_50 were ascertained and
translated to VHDL, they were then ready to be programmed onto an FPGA. The Vivado
Design Suite was utilized to accomplish this. The initial programming of the board
included producing a block diagram of the system, creation of a new IP for the project in
the Vivado Design Suite, instantiation of the VHDL circuit, synthesis, implementation,
and bitstream generation.
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Table 3.1 Development Environment
Task

Hardware/Software Utilized

Reference

Language Translation

Program Encryption Toolkit

[30]

SoC / FPGA

Zynq-7000 SoC XC7Z020-CLG484-1

[31]

Design Suite

Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2017.1

[32]

Software Development

Xilinx Vivado Software Development Kit 2017.1

[33]

Of the above steps for hardware programming and specification, the creation and
instantiation of the IP requires the most hands-on approach and attention to detail. In the
IP creation process, the VHDL translated circuits are used to create a new IP with inputs,
outputs, and logic all packaged into one module. It is important to note that the logic
within this module is tagged as “dont_touch” to keep the synthesizer from optimizing the
circuit and removing the redundancies intentionally inserted in the logic. This module is
then able to be inserted into a block diagram along with the Zynq ARM processing
system and other modules necessary for the circuit to execute. A depiction of the block
diagram created and utilized in for Native DES can be found in Figure 3.2. Here the
created IP for Native DES (“des_ip_0” in the diagram), the Zynq processing system,
processor system reset, and AXI interconnect, GPIO (pin trigger), and their
interconnections are all clearly visible. With the exception of the IP utilized for Native
Upon completion of the hardware specifications, the project and most importantly
the generated bitstream are then exported to Xilinx’s Software Development Kit (SDK)
for the last steps in programming the FPGA. In the SDK, the FPGA is programmed to
receive serial communication through the UART. A simple “HelloWorld” file is created
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Figure 3.2 Native DES Block Diagram.

and written to initiate the encryption specified by the IP in Vivado (found in Appendix
A). The board’s UART is then connected, the board is programmed, and the ciphertext is
visible in the SDK’s terminal. Figure 3.3 shows the SDK terminal of Native DES just
after encryption was initiated on the device. The project in the SDK is then transferred to
a boot loader so that the device can be programmed from flash memory and remain
programmed when power cycled. These same steps are taken to program all three circuits
onto the Zedboard.

Figure 3.3 Native DES SDK Terminal.
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3.1.3 Task III
This section outlines the process of gathering side channel traces and the
subsequent comparison. For the analysis of these circuits, both power and
electromagnetic traces are collected. Riscure’s Inspector SCA is used to carry out these
analyses and provide the traces necessary to make comparisons between Native DES,
Variant DES_20, and Variant DES_50. Although the purpose of the research is not to
break the DES encryption and ascertain the key, the traces gathered will provide insight
into the inner workings of the circuits, which we believe will highlight their differences.
Before these traces can be collected, a trigger must be created. This is what alerts
the software to begin taking traces of the system. Although not every analysis requires a
trigger, it is necessary for this research since multiple circuits are analyzed and compared
from beginning to end of the encryption process. The simplest and most easy to
implement trigger is one that signals the software to begin capturing when a pin goes
high and end capturing when that same pin goes low. The pin trigger will be utilized in
both the power and electromagnetic analyses and can be seen in Figure 3.2 as the GPIO
IP. The trigger can also be used to determine the execution time (te) of each circuit.
Because a pin is set to go high just before encryption starts and low just after it ends, te
can easily be ascertained by analyzing the width of the square wave pulse generated
during every execution cycle. This calculation is essential to collecting useful traces
because a precise execution time ensures traces gathered include the entire encryption
process and not just bits and pieces.
With te determined, the software must be set up to take measurements of the
device. The first acquisition measurements to be defined are the oscilloscope
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specifications. The first of these is the sample frequency (fs). Sample frequency is the
number of samples taken per second of the signal and must be at least twice the operating
frequency of the device. For our device, our sample frequency must be at least 200MHz,
so for our acquisition the closest frequency greater than or equal to twice our operating
frequency is 250MHz. The next acquisition measurement to be calculated is the number
of samples to be taken. This figure is dependent on the sample frequency and the
execution time of the implemented design. It can be evaluated using the formula below,
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 = (𝑓𝑠 )(𝑡𝐸 ).
The next acquisition measurements to specify are the trigger properties. The
trigger is connected to the external channel of the scope so this should be specified in the
acquisition. The voltage level must be set to 300mV and the slope set to rising edge to
guarantee the software catches the voltage spike from the trigger when encryption starts.
The delay and timeout values should keep their default values, 0.00s and 1.0s
respectively.
The channel properties for the PicoScope are specified next. These measurements
are specific to the type of measurement being taken (i.e. power, electromagnetic, etc.).
For collections of power traces, the voltage range must be set to 20mV, the offset set to
0.0V, the bandwidth set to “Full”, and the coupling should be “DC”. This will ensure the
traces taken yield the best view of the changing power measurements across the device.
For electromagnetic traces on the other hand, the voltage range must be at least 500mV to
capture the full trace and reduce clipping. The offset voltage, bandwidth, and coupling
specifications for electromagnetic traces are the same as those for power traces. The
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specific acquisition measurements for each trace collected are consolidated into tables in
the next section.
Next in the trace collection process is the setup of the FPGA with the PicoScope
and Riscure Inspector SCA. A representation of the experimental setup is shown in
Figure 3.4. Here for power measurements, a differential current probe is placed in series
with the power supply and PicoScope where the probe measures the current across the
device’s Current Sense. For electromagnetic measurements, the current probe is replaced
with an electromagnetic probe to capture emanations across the device. This system will
hereafter be referred to as system under test (SUT).

Figure 3.4 System Under Test (SUT).
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Once analysis begins, traces of the encryption are generated. In this process,
Inspector SCA takes “snapshots” of the system during different periods of the encryption
process. These “snapshots” of power consumption and electromagnetic signatures are
what will be used to compare the native to its variants. Sample traces obtained from
Riscure SCA tutorials can be found in Figure 3.5. The data comes from a power trace of a
software implementation of DES analyzed using Riscure’s Inspector SCA, which is the
proposed analysis tool for this research. The figure shows an initial power trace of
Software DES and clearly indicates the 16 rounds within DES encryption.

Figure 3.5 16 Distinct Rounds of DES [35].

With both power and electromagnetic traces gathered, they can then be compared,
Native to Variant DES_20, Native to Variant DES_50, and Variant DES_20 to Variant
DES_50 as needed.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

In the experimentation process, we collected and analyzed data in both the Vivado
Design Suite and the Inspector SCA software. In Vivado, the data gathered focused more
on hardware requirements, utilization, and design implementation of the DES circuits.
Results compiled from Inspector SCA on the other hand centered around the collection of
the power and electromagnetic side channels for each circuit. This section will examine
in detail the data gathered in both Vivado and Inspector SCA. The remainder of this
section is as follows, Section 4.1 will analyze the observations and data collection from
the Vivado Design Suite; and Section 4.2 will evaluate those from Inspector SCA.

4.1 Observations in Vivado
Within the Vivado Design Suite, various useful reports and graphs are generated
once synthesis and implementation of the design are completed. This section will
examine several of these reports and any initial conclusions that may be drawn from
them. For each report, Native DES, Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 will be
examined and compared in that order.
In Vivado when a design is created, it is packaged and inserted into a block
diagram. From here, the design must be synthesized and implemented to ensure it has
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been correctly employed on the device and does not exceed the limits of the hardware.
During the implementation process, the design goes through logical, physical, and power
optimizations to provide the most efficient logic cell placement and routing on the device.
Because the bulk of this research depends on logical redundancies to create obfuscation
in both Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50, it is imperative that this optimization does
not take place. The removal of the optimization step in implementation involves a simple
Python script that places a “dont_touch” attribute on wires within the source VHDL for
each circuit (found in Appendix B). This ensures that the optimizer does not change any
of the logic within the source file therefore keeping the obfuscated logic intact.

4.1.1 Before Optimization Removal
Although optimization is not necessary for this research, some reports from the
optimized designs do lend some insight into the overall design of the circuits and their
similarities. For example, the Device View of each design shows the Zynq-7000 SoC
with highlighted areas representing the utilized logic cells and their placement on the
chip. A zoomed in view of a highlighted section can be found in Figure 4.1 where the
utilized logic cells are look up tables (LUTs).
Keeping this in mind, we can compare the Device View of the implemented
design for Native DES to that of Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 shown in Figure
4.2, Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4 respectively. In these figures it is important to note that the
orange highlights in the design are located where the Zynq processor is on the chip.
Conversely, the blue highlights are in the dedicated portion of the chip for programmable
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logic (PL). Here from initial observations, when optimization is performed on the
designs, the PL of both variants very closely resemble that of our native circuit,

Figure 4.1 Logic Cells.

with some small variations in logic cell placement. This is expected as the only difference
in the three circuits is the addition of AND-trees in Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50
while retaining original functionality.
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Figure 4.2 Device View: Native DES with Optimization.

Figure 4.3 Device View: Variant DES_20 with Optimization.
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Figure 4.4 Device View: Variant DES_50 with Optimization.

4.1.2 After Optimization Removal
As mentioned in the previous section, to keep the development software from
optimizing our variant circuits, a script was utilized that added in “dont_touch” attributes
to all wire declarations in the design. This prompted the optimizer to skip over these parts
of the logic in the implementation process. The reports that were generated as a result
will be examined below. We will begin by again comparing the Device View of all three
circuits after implementation. The Device View for Native DES, Variant DES_20 and
Variant DES_50 can be found in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, and Figure 4.7 respectively.
From these images we can see that all three circuits look different from one another in
logic placement and size. In comparing these images to those in the previous section, the
difference optimization makes in circuit design and logic placement is evident. Without
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the optimization that would normally occur, the circuits retain their size and redundancies
allowing them to present as three functionally different circuits as opposed to ones that
are functionally equivalent. Interestingly, if we look closely at the logic cell placement
for the variant circuits, we can see parts of our original Native DES in the sections
marked X0Y1 and X0Y2. These similarities are expected since Variant DES_20 and
Variant DES_20 do still contain the basic logic of Native DES with only AND-trees
added for obfuscation. Even with these similarities in logic placement, the circuits appear
to be distinct designs and not variant implementations of the same circuit.

Figure 4.5 Device View: Native DES.

A comparison can also be made from the chip utilizations of each circuit. For
each design, a utilization report is generated that provides specifics on the utilized slices
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Figure 4.6 Device View: Variant DES_20 without Optimization.

Figure 4.7 Device View: Variant DES_50 without Optimization.

in the PL of the device. In the PL, a configurable logic block (CLB) in the Zynq-7000
SoC is made up of two slices where slices consist of a combination of LUTs and flip
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flops (FFs). The hardware resources an FPGA has is determined by the number of slices
the device has [34]. Table 4.1 outlines the various logic cell types available on the chip as
well as their utilizations for both native and variant circuits. In the table, we can see that
from Native DES to Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 there is a significant increase
in total utilization. The first Variant DES_20 is approximately 5.29 times larger than
Native DES when placed on the chip while Variant DES_50 is around 5.55 times larger
than Native DES and just slightly larger than Variant DES_20 (roughly 5% larger).
In this table, the main contributors to differences in utilization totals are the LUTs
used as logic within the PL of the device. The amount of LUTs as logic used in Variant
DES_20 is roughly 7.38 times more than those used in Native DES. Similarly, the LUTs
used in Variant DES_50 are around 7.78 times more than that of the Native DES
implementation. Again, as expected, Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 employ
considerably more LUTs as logic than Native DES which can be attributed to the
redundancies added into the logic for obfuscation. The LUTs as memory, registers as flip
flops, and I/O (input/output) for each circuit yield the same values, so it follows that these
areas of the chip include slices that are required for the base functionality of each DES
implementation.
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Variant
DES_50

Variant
DES_20

Native DES

62
938
1
14771
62
938
1

Register as FF
I/O
LUTs as Logic
LUTs as Memory
Register as FF
I/O

14021

LUTs as Logic
LUTs as Memory

1

I/O

62

LUTs as Memory
938

1898

LUTs as Logic

Register as FF

Used

Site Type

Table 4.1 Device Utilization without Optimization

200

106400

17400

53200

200

106400

17400

53200

200

106400

17400

53200

Available

0.5

0.88

0.36

27.77

0.5

0.88

0.36

26.36

0.5

0.88

0.36

3.57

Utilization (%)

29.51

28.1

5.31

Total Utilization (%)

4.2 Observations in Inspector SCA
Riscure’s Inspector SCA is used in this research to capture both power and
electromagnetic side channels of the SUT during execution. As stated in Chapter III, to
begin taking traces of a device, the acquisition measurements must first be defined and
set within the Riscure software. The first of these required calculations is the execution
time for each circuit. To determine this value, we connected our device, which had the
circuit design booted from flash memory, to the PicoScope. With the device on and
executing in an infinite loop, we could clearly see the square wave pulse generated by the
pin trigger in the scope software. A snapshot of one of these pulses can be seen in Figure
4.8.

Figure 4.8 Execution Time Measurement.
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This process was repeated for each circuit implementation to determine the
execution time. Although the exact execution time of each design was calculated, this
value is not what was utilized to compute “Num Samples”. Because we want to ensure
the entire encryption process is included in each trace, we rounded the encryption times
up to the nearest tenth of a millisecond. This guaranteed at least one and at most two
iterations of encryption could be seen in our collected traces. Once this value was
determined, the other acquisition measurements were defined. These values can be found
in Table 4.2.
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Emag

Power

0.10838
0.10932
0.1094
0.10838
0.10932

Variant DES-50
Native DES
Variant DES_20
Variant DES-50

0.10932

Variant DES-50

Variant DES_20

0.10838

Variant DES_20

0.1094

0.1094

Native DES

Native DES

Calculated (ms)

Circuits

Table 4.2 Trace Acquisition Measurements

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

Utilized ts (s)

250

250

250

500

500

500

250

250

250

fs (MHz)

55000

55000

55000

100000

100000

100000

55000

55000

55000

Samples

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

Traces

All samples collected adhere to the acquisition measurements outlined in the
table. The subsequent traces and scans are analyzed and evaluated in this section. The
power side channels of the native and variant circuits will be examined first followed by
the electromagnetic side channels and subsequent traces.
4.2.1 The Power Side Channel
In collecting the power traces for this research, the system was set up just as that
in the SUT depicted in Chapter III, and the acquisition measurements used were those in
Table 4.3. The first set of traces gathered had a sample frequency of 250MHz and 55,000
samples. The resulting trace for Native DES is shown in Figure 4.9.

Figure 4.9 Power: Native DES – 250MHz.

Because this trace is very noisy and not much can be inferred in its raw state, we
applied both a moving average filter and spectrum analysis to make things a bit clearer. A
moving average filter is one that analyzes data points by calculating various averages of
subsets of the full dataset. With this filter we can average the samples in the trace and
therefore reduce the noise in the raw collection. The Native DES power trace with the
moving average filter applied is in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10 Power: Native DES – 250MHz – Moving Average.

Here we can see that the trace is much clearer but still very noisy with little to no
clear indicators of the encryption on the device. Figure 4.11 shows the Native DES power
trace with spectrum analysis applied. This process analyzes the frequency spectrum of a
trace and verifies clock frequency. The resulting trace gives us an examination of time
series within the frequency domain [35].

Figure 4.11 Power: Native DES – 250MHz – Spectrum.

In this trace there are various peaks present, but the most interesting is the one
near 63MHz. This peak tells us that there is some significant activity going on in the chip
near this frequency. We believe that this activity is the encryption running on the device,
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but this cannot be verified as the Zynq-7000 processor is very noisy and is controlling
more than just our implemented design.
Comparable to the traces collected for Native DES are those compiled for Variant
DES_20 and Variant DES_50. The same filter and analysis conducted on Native DES
were performed on each variant. The raw trace, spectrum analysis, and moving target
filter for Variant DES_20 can be found in Figure 4.12, and those for Variant DES_50 are
depicted in Figure 4.13. Similar to those in Native DES, the raw traces for each variant
are noisy and almost indecipherable. The moving average filter applied on the raw traces
for each variant again makes the traces clearer but are still difficult to read. The spectrum
analysis conducted on the traces, on the other hand shows us a similar graph to that
generated in Figure 4.11. We can clearly see a distinct peak near 63MHz for each variant.
Because this is present in each implementation, we believe this represents our encryption
but still cannot verify this with these power traces. In comparing the filtered and analyzed
traces to each other directly, it is difficult to distinguish one circuit from another. This
does not altogether disprove our hypothesis because we believe this is due to either the
influence of the processor creating added noise in the traces or the extremely small
changes in current through the current sense that we are measuring over.
The second set of power traces collected had a sample frequency of 500MHz and
took 100,000 samples. With this sample frequency the traces should have 2 iterations of
encryption present in them. These traces, like the first set, all had noisy raw traces and
needed filters and analysis to make them more legible. Both the moving average filter
and spectrum analysis were applied to Native DES, Variant DES_20 and Variant
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DES_50 traces at 500MHz. These traces, filters and analyses for native and variant
circuits are shown in Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16.

Figure 4.12 Power: Variant DES_20 – 250MHz.
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Figure 4.13 Power: Variant DES_50 – 250MHz.

Figure 4.14 Power: Native DES – 500MHz.
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Figure 4.15 Power: Variant DES_20 – 500MHz.

Figure 4.16 Power: Variant DES_50 – 500MHz.
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In each of the traces generated from the spectrum analysis, two distinct peaks are
present. If we look at them a bit closer, it seems that they are first and second harmonics.
One large peak is near 63MHz and a smaller peak is located around 188MHz. As in the
previous set of traces, we believe these two peaks are representative of the two rounds of
encryption on the device within the selected period. In addition to this similarity, there
are little to no major differences in the graphs from one circuit to another. For this reason,
it is difficult to declare these are three separate circuits if previous knowledge about the
logic is not readily available. Again, we believe this is due to the Zynq-7000 processor.
Therefore, the bulk of our analysis and conclusions will be based on the electromagnetic
side channel measurements as these are based on emanations throughout the device and
not the power consumed during execution. These samples are examined in the next
section.
4.2.2 The Electromagnetic Side Channel
The electromagnetic traces obtained for this research were collected using a slight
variation of the SUT where the current probe is replaced with the electromagnetic probe.
Before these traces could be taken, an XY scan of the device had to be collected first. The
XY scans produce 20x20 spectral intensity graphs that indicate various hotspots on the
device. Once all four hundred device locations and their spectral intensity are gathered,
traces can be taken on user selected areas of the scan. The spectral intensity scans for
Native DES, Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 are shown in Figures 4.17, 4.18, and
4.19 respectively. For each scan, the locations of the hotspots tell us that each design is
executing in approximately the same area of the device. If we compare these scans to the
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logic cell placement found in the device view for each design (Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7),
it is evident that the hotspots align with the placement of logic blocks on the device.

Figure 4.17 Spectral Intensity – Native DES.
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Figure 4.18 Spectral Intensity – Variant DES_20.

Figure 4.19 Spectral Intensity – Variant DES_50.
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For the trace collections and subsequent comparisons, the traces to be collected
were determined based on hotspots in the Native DES spectral intensity scan. Because we
are comparing the variants to the native implementation, it follows that we compare the
same locations while each device is executing. The sites on the scan we decided to collect
are site 84, site 89, and site 104 which all fall within or near the center of the hotspots for
Native DES. The location that produced the clearest traces was site 89 so this will be the
focus of our analysis.
The traces had a sample frequency of 250MHz and 55,000 samples. The raw trace
for Native DES at site 89 can be found in Figure 4.20. This trace has several peaks and
troughs approximately 7.5µs apart, but this width is too small for these to be the triggered
encryption on the device.

Figure 4.20 Emag: Native DES.

In addition to these peaks and troughs is a small section in the middle of the trace
that is about 8µs in length. A zoomed in view of this section of the trace can be seen in
Figure 4.21. At first glance it seems like this may be the encryption executing on the
device, but again the length of the section is too small for the execution time we
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calculated for Native DES. However, it is possible that this small section represents only
a part of the execution, and the remainder lies within the noise on either side of the
highlighted area. Because the site this trace was gathered from lies right in the heart of
the device’s hotspot, we do believe that the encryption does lie within the trace, but
without several filters and analyses it is difficult to definitively make that assertion.

Figure 4.21 Emag: Native DES – Zoomed.

To clear up some of the periodic peaks/troughs in the raw trace, a harmonics
filter was applied. The resulting trace is shown in Figure 4.22. In this trace we can see
that those peaks/troughs are no longer visible on the graph. Although cleaned up
considerably, the trace still needs some more maintenance, so spectrum analysis was
applied to the harmonics trace. This new spectrum analysis graph can be found in Figure
4.23.
In Figure 4.23 we can see that we have a much clearer graph with one very
distinct peak around 100MHz. Because these are not power measurements that may be
impacted by the lingering power fluctuations across the device, we are more confident
that the peak in this graph signifies the DES implementation on the chip. It is important
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to remember the electromagnetic side channel carries information about emanations in
the device when current flows and is based on changing logic states during device
execution.
The traces from site 89 collected from Variant DES_20 and Variant DES_50 can
be found in Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25 respectively. In these figures, the top graph is the
raw trace for site 89, the middle graph is an intermediate filtering stage as in Figure 4.22,
and the bottom graph is spectral analysis performed on the filtered graph.

Figure 4.22 Emag: Native DES – Harmonics.

Figure 4.23 Emag: Native DES – Spectrum.
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Figure 4.24 Emag: Variant DES_20.

Figure 4.24 Emag: Variant DES_50.
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In analyzing these traces and their filtered and analyzed versions, like Native
DES they too have a large peak around 100MHz in the spectrum analysis graph that we
believe is the encryption. Although these traces are very similar to each other in this
respect, unlike the power traces, these traces (both raw and filtered/analyzed) when
compared one to another do have minor differences mainly in the ranges of the signals
and the amplitudes of the peaks present in the graphs. When analyzed by a competent
adversary, we believe these differences would be apparent and would compel one to
believe that each graph is representative of a functionally different circuit.

53

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provides an overview of the results found in the experimentation
process. Section 5.1 provides a summary of our results while Section 5.2 offers an outline
of the future work proposed if this research were to be continued.

5.1 Summary of Findings
In a world where technological advancements rise and fall and at an alarmingly
fast rate, system security and integrity are ever-growing fields. Because of these
advancements, reverse engineering techniques such as side channel analysis are also
advancing and growing into powerful threats to the security community. With dangers
like these on the horizon, protection methods such as moving target defense are becoming
a major research focus. This technique at its most basic level seeks to lessen the attack
surface available to an adversary in a variety of ways. This research, however, utilizes
circuit variance as a method of moving target defense to not only lessen the attack surface
but also to make it as incomprehensible as possible.
In this research, our main goal was to determine if side channel characterizations
of functionally equivalent native and variant circuits would manifest themselves
differently enough for the circuits to be distinguished as three separate circuits. To
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accomplish this goal, native and variant implementations of DES were ascertained and
programmed onto an FPGA. The power and electromagnetic side channels of each circuit
were then collected and analyzed for any indication that the circuits, although
functionally equivalent, were three distinct implementations.
In concluding our experimentation, we found that while the goal was to collect
both power and electromagnetic side channels, the power side channels collected were
not effective. The power traces we gathered, though informative, did not yield conclusive
results as the traces were too noisy. This noise, we believe, is due to a combination of the
almost imperceptible changes in current flows throughout the device that may not be
detected by the analysis software, and the ARM processor running and creating excess
noise in the traces that unfortunately could not be filtered out. We did find, however, that
our electromagnetic traces did yield results. In these traces we saw that both our raw and
filtered traces there were differences in the native and side channel characterizations.
Although small, these differences could aid in lessening the attack surface for these
circuits as the analysis of three distinct circuits would require no less than three distinct
approaches for reverse engineering. Based on these findings, we can conclude that side
channel characterizations of functionally equivalent circuit variants can be used to
distinguish native from variant. Though more analyses should be completed, and more
traces taken, our preliminary findings allow us to state that the presence of circuit
variance does have an impact on side channel characterizations. We believe that these
findings do support the further analysis on the impact of circuit variation on side channel
representations.
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5.2 Future Work
There are several areas of this research that have been defined as vectors for
continued study. The first of these is the DES implementation utilized in this research.
This implementation as we stated before could not be verified against other traditional
implementations of DES because of a byte ordering issue within the logic. Future work
on this vector would include rectifying this byte ordering issue and verifying the DES
implementation against traditional DES. Although the functionality of the circuits used in
this research are not what is tested, ensuring the desired circuit executes correctly would
add to the confidence of any results and conclusions reached.
In addition are the power traces collected in this research. Although these traces
did not yield the results expected, it would be beneficial to take more power
measurements. There are two approaches that we see could be taken for these
measurements. 1: The power traces could be taken again, and more filtering and cleanup
could be done on the individual traces to pinpoint areas for comparison; 2. New traces
could be taken on the same chip with the elimination of the excess noise (e.g., similar to a
pinata implementation of the ARM processor). Either of these approaches would aid in
giving concrete results of the power measurements of the executing device.
And lastly, in future work are the electromagnetic traces taken for this research. In
our approach, we only collected traces for 3-4 sites on the chip whereas the chip has 400
sites designated in the spectral intensity scan. Future work in this vector would include
taking traces of considerably more sites on the chip (at least 20%). While this was not a
timely option in our approach, the addition of more traces would strengthen the results
and make the subsequent conclusions more reliable.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Vivado SDK HelloWorld.c (Encryption)

#include <stdio.h>
#include "platform.h"
#include "xil_printf.h"
#include "xil_types.h"
#include "xparameters.h"
#include "xil_io.h"
#include "sleep.h"
#include "xgpio.h"
static XGpio Trigger;
int main() {
init_platform();
int gpio_status;
uint32_t key_upper = 0xfeedfeed;
uint32_t key_lower = 0xfeedfeed;
uint32_t plaintext_upper = 0xdeadbeef;
uint32_t plaintext_lower = 0xdeadbeef;
xil_printf("Running Native DES: \r\n");
/*************************
* GPIO initialization
*
*************************/
gpio_status = XGpio_Initialize(&Trigger, XPAR_AXI_GPIO_0_DEVICE_ID);
if (gpio_status != XST_SUCCESS) {
printf("GPIO Initialization Failed\r\n");
return XST_FAILURE;
}
XGpio_SetDataDirection(&Trigger, 1, 0); //Set Trigger as output
xil_printf("Plaintext: %x%x\r\n", plaintext_upper, plaintext_lower);

while(1) //Encryption loop
{
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usleep(10000);
usleep(10000);
usleep(10000);
usleep(10000);
usleep(10000);
usleep(10000);
XGpio_DiscreteWrite(&Trigger, 1, 1); //set trigger high
// encrypt
Xil_Out32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR, key_upper);
Xil_Out32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR + 4, key_lower);
Xil_Out32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR + 8, plaintext_upper);
Xil_Out32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR + 12, plaintext_lower);
usleep(100);
uint32_t ciphertext_upper = Xil_In32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR + 16);
uint32_t ciphertext_lower = Xil_In32(XPAR_DES_IP_0_S00_AXI_BASEADDR + 20);
xil_printf("Ciphertext: %x%x\r\n", ciphertext_upper, ciphertext_lower);
}
XGpio_DiscreteWrite(&Trigger, 1, 0); //trigger low
cleanup_platform();
return 0;
}
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Appendix B: “Dont_Touch” Script

import re
#DES20 files
DES20path = "\sydne\OneDrive\Documents\Research\CircuitsinVivado\DES20\DES1.vhdl"
DES20 = open(DES20path, 'r')
DES20editspath = "\sydne\OneDrive\Documents\Research\CircuitsinVivado\DES20\DES20edits.txt"
DES20edits = open (DES20editspath, 'w')
#DES50 files
DES50path = "\sydne\OneDrive\Documents\Research\CircuitsinVivado\DES50\DES50.vhdl"
DES50 = open(DES50path, 'r')
DES50editspath = "\sydne\OneDrive\Documents\Research\CircuitsinVivado\DES50\DES50edits.txt"
DES50edits = open (DES50editspath, 'w')

#DES20 dont_touch
for line in DES20:
match = re.search(r'wire[0-9]+' , line)
string = " attribute dont_touch of " + match.group() + " : signal is \"true\";"
DES20edits.write("\n")
DES20edits.write(string)
#DES50 dont_touch
for line in DES50:
match = re.search(r'wire[0-9]+' , line)
string = " attribute dont_touch of " + match.group() + " : signal is \"true\";"
DES50edits.write("\n")
DES50edits.write(string)

#flush files
DES20edits.flush()
DES50edits.flush()
#close files
DES20edits.close()
DES50edits.close()
DES20.close()
DES50.close()
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